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Abstract—We consider the problem of stabilizing a plant
with a network of resource constrained wireless nodes. In
a companion paper, we developed a protocol where each
node repeatedly transmits an appropriate (stabilizing) linear
combination of the values in its neighborhood. In this paper,
we design an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for this control
scheme, which observes the transmissions of certain nodes and
uses that information to (a) recover the plant outputs (for data-
logging and diagnostic purposes) and (b) identify malicious
behavior by any of the wireless nodes in the network. We show
that if the connectivity of the network is sufﬁciently high, the
IDS only needs to observe a subset of the nodes in the network
in order to achieve this objective. Our approach provides a
characterization of the set of nodes that should be observed, a
systematic procedure for the IDS to use to identify the malicious
nodes and recover the outputs of the plant, and an upper bound
on the delay required to obtain the necessary information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of low-cost and reliable wireless networks
holds great promise for large, spatially distributed industrial
control systems. The topic of control over networks (wireless
or otherwise) has been intensively studied by researchers
over the past decade, leading to design procedures for
controllers that are tolerant to network imperfections such
as packet dropouts and transmission delays [1], [2], [3].
In the companion paper [4], we introduced the Wireless
Control Network (WCN), where the network itself acts
as the controller (instead of having a specially designated
node performing this task). Speciﬁcally, we considered a
wireless network consisting of simple nodes that are able
to exchange information only with their direct neighbors.
We devised a protocol where each node transmits, at each
time-step, a single value that is a linear combination of
the values in its neighborhood. This scheme causes the
wireless network to behave as a linear system with sparsity
constraints on the system matrices (corresponding to the
topology of the network). We provided a numerical design
procedure (based on linear matrix inequalities) to determine
the appropriate linear combinations for each node to use
in order to stabilize the plant. As discussed in [4], this
scheme has several beneﬁts, including simple scheduling,
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low computational requirements, and the ability to handle
geographically dispersed sensing and actuation points.
Recently, the need for a rigorous theory of security in
industrial control systems has started to gain attention [5],
[6], [7], [8]. In domains such as chemical process industries,
aviation and critical infrastructure, attacks on the control
systems could have disastrous consequences. The report [9]
makes several key recommendations for designing secure
control systems, including the need to maintain accurate
logs of plant behavior, and to analyze this information to
quickly detect and isolate anomalies. In traditional (data)
networks, this is performed with an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS), which raises an alarm if the observed trafﬁc
ﬂow in the network deviates from expected patterns [10]. The
paper [11] suggests an IDS for wireless networks in process
control industries, capturing (at a policy level) attacks such
as jamming, denial of service attacks, and corruptions in the
formatting of data transmitted by certain nodes.
A more dangerous (and difﬁcult to detect) attack in control
networks is that of data modiﬁcation, where malicious nodes
subtly change the contents of messages that they are passing
through the network, but otherwise follow the normal rules
of transmission. In this paper, we describe how to design
an IDS to detect data modiﬁcation attacks in the control
scheme proposed in [4]. The IDS will be responsible for
observing the transmissions of certain nodes in the network
in order to (a) recover the outputs of the plant (e.g., for
data-logging purposes), and (b) identify data modiﬁcation
attacks; the overall architecture of the plant, control network
and IDS is shown in Fig. 1. We show that the wireless control
scheme from [4] allows malicious behavior to be identiﬁed
by examining the transmissions of only a subset of the nodes
in the network, provided that the network topology satisﬁes
certain conditions. We provide an explicit characterization of
the subset of nodes that needs to be monitored, along with
a procedure for the IDS to follow in order to extract the
required information from the transmissions of these nodes.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the wireless control network with an IDS.
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978-1-4244-7746-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE 5979II. NOTATION AND BACKGROUND ON GRAPH THEORY
We use ei to denote the column vector (of appropriate
size) with a 1 in its i-th position and 0’s elsewhere, and 1 to
denote the column vector (of appropriate size) consisting of
all 1’s. The symbol IN denotes the N × N identity matrix,
and A′ indicates the transpose of matrix A. The cardinality
of a set S is denoted by |S|, and for two sets S and R, we
use S \R to denote the set of elements in S that are not in
R. The set of nonnegative integers is denoted by N.
A graph is an ordered pair G = {V,E}, where V =
{v1,v2,...,vN} is a set of vertices (or nodes), and E is
a set of ordered pairs of different vertices, called directed
edges. The vertices in the set Nvi = {vj|(vj,vi) ∈ E}
are the neighbors of vertex vi. A subgraph of G is a graph
H = {¯ V, ¯ E}, with ¯ V ⊆ V and ¯ E ⊆ E (where all edges in ¯ E
are between vertices in ¯ V).
A path P from vertex vi0 to vertex vit is a sequence of
vertices vi0vi1   vit such that (vij,vij+1) ∈ E for 0 ≤ j ≤
t−1. The nonnegative integer t is the length of the path. We
will call a graph disconnected if there exists at least one pair
of vertices vi,vj ∈ V such that there is no path from vj to
vi. The connectivity of the graph is the smallest number of
vertices that must be removed to disconnect the graph, and
is denoted by κ. A set of paths P1,P2,...,Pr are vertex
disjoint if no vertex appears in more than one path. Given
two subsets V1,V2 ⊂ V, an r-linking from V1 to V2 is a set
of r vertex disjoint paths, each with start vertex in V1 and
end vertex in V2. Note that if V1 and V2 are not disjoint, we
will take their common vertices to be vertex disjoint paths
between V1 and V2 of length zero.
Lemma 1 ([12]): Let G = {V,E} have connectivity κ,
and let V1 and V2 be subsets of V, each of size at least κ.
Then there is a κ-linking from V1 to V2 (and vice versa).
III. THE WIRELESS CONTROL NETWORK
Consider a plant of the form:
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] + Bu[k], y[k] = Cx[k], (1)
with A ∈ Rn×n,B ∈ Rn×m and C ∈ Rp×n. The
output vector y[k] =
 
y1[k] y2[k] ... yp[k]
 ′
con-
tains measurements of the plant state vector x[k] pro-
vided by the sensors s1,...,sp. The input vector u[k] =  
u1[k] u2[k] ... um[k]
 ′
corresponds to the signals ap-
plied to the plant by actuators a1,...,am.
The plant is to be controlled using a wireless network
consisting of a set of nodes that interact with each other
and with the sensors and actuators installed on the plant.
The network is described by a graph G = {V,E}, where
V = {v1,v2,...,vN} is the set of N nodes and E ⊆ V ×V
represents the radio connectivity (communication topology)
in the network (i.e., edge (vj,vi) ∈ E if node vi can receive
information directly from node vj). In addition, we deﬁne
VS ⊂ V as the set of nodes that can receive information
directly from at least one sensor, and VA ⊂ V as the
set of nodes whose transmissions can be heard by at least
one actuator. We will refer to VS as the source nodes
in the network. We will also assume that there are some
malicious nodes in the network, given by the set F ⊂ V.
These malicious nodes will transmit false values (perhaps
by conspiring with each other) in an attempt to damage the
system in some way. Note that the set F is unknown a priori.
We will ﬁnd it convenient to consider a new graph ¯ G that
captures how the plant outputs enter into the wireless control
network. This graph is obtained by taking the network graph
G and adding p new vertices S = {s1,s2,...,sp}, which
correspond to the sensors on the plant. Deﬁne the edge set
EI =
 
(sl,vj)
sl ∈ S,vj ∈ VS,
sl’s value is available to node vj
 
.
We then obtain ¯ G = {V ∪ S,E ∪ EI}.
The proposed control scheme (introduced in [4]) consists
of having each node in the network update its value to be a
linear combination of its previous value and the values of its
neighbors. In addition, each source node will include a linear
combination of the sensor measurements (i.e., plant outputs)
that it receives at each time-step. Finally, the malicious
nodes will update their values arbitrarily at each time-step.
Mathematically, if we let zi[k] denote node vi’s value at
time-step k, we obtain the update equations:1
zi[k + 1] = (2)

        
        
wiizi[k] +
 
vj∈Nvi wijzj[k]
+
 
sj∈Nvi hijyj[k] if vi ∈ VS \ F,
wiizi[k] +
 
vj∈Nvi wijzj[k]
+
 
sj∈Nvi hijyj[k] + fi[k] if vi ∈ VS ∩ F,
wiizi[k] +
 
vj∈Nvi wijzj[k] + fi[k] if vi ∈ F \ VS,
wiizi[k] +
 
vj∈Nvi wijzj[k] if vi / ∈ VS ∪ F.
The scalars wij and hij specify the linear combina-
tions that are computed by each node in the network. The
scalar fi[k] is an (arbitrary) additive error committed by
node vi at time-step k if it is malicious. If we let F =
{vj1,vj2,...,vj|F|} denote the set of malicious nodes, and
aggregate the values transmitted by all nodes at time-step k
into the value vector z[k] =
 
z1[k] z2[k]     zN[k]
 ′
,
the transmission strategy for the entire system can be repre-
sented as
z[k + 1] = Wz[k] +
 
H EF
 
      
BF
 
y[k]
f[k]
 
      
v[k]
, (3)
for all k ∈ N. In the above equation, EF =  
ej1 ej2     ej|F|
 
, and the vector f[k] contains all of
the additive errors injected by the malicious nodes at time-
step k. Furthermore, the (i,j) entry of W satisﬁes wij = 0
if vj / ∈ Nvi ∪{vi}, and the (i,j) entry of H satisﬁes hij = 0
if sj / ∈ Nvi. We assume that z[0] (i.e., the initial state of the
WCN) is known to the IDS.
At each actuator l ∈ {1,2,...,m}, we apply the input
ul[k] = glz[k], where gl is a vector that speciﬁes a linear
combination of the values transmitted by the nodes in VA
1The neighborhood Nv of a vertex v is with respect to the graph ¯ G.
5980that can be heard by that actuator. Thus, the entire input
applied to the system can be written as u[k] = Gz[k], where
the sparsity pattern in G adheres to the network topology.
When there are no malicious nodes (i.e., F = ∅), the overall
closed loop system evolves as:
 
x[k + 1]
z[k + 1]
 
=
 
A BG
HC W
  
x[k]
z[k]
 
, ˆ A
 
x[k]
z[k]
 
.
Let Ψs denote the set of all tuples (W,H,G) that satisfy
the required sparsity patterns and that cause the matrix ˆ A to
be stable. In [4], a numerical procedure was provided to ﬁnd
an element of Ψs (if one exists).
In this paper, we consider the problem of data collection
and analysis in this network for the purpose of identifying
malicious behavior by a nonempty subset F of nodes. Specif-
ically, we will describe the design of an IDS whose task is to
collect data from the network in order to (a) recover the plant
outputs2 y[k] and (b) detect and isolate anomalous behavior
in the WCN. Clearly, one trivial option would be for the IDS
to listen to the transmissions of every node and sensor in the
network, and double-check that all nodes are computing the
proper linear combinations at each time-step. However, this
is not a satisfactory solution, since the entire point of the
WCN is to avoid the communication infrastructure required
for a centralized solution of this kind. Instead, we will show
that it is possible to identify the malicious nodes and obtain
the plant outputs by monitoring the transmissions of just
a subset T ⊂ V of the nodes (provided that the network
topology satisﬁes certain conditions).
IV. ANALYSIS ALGORITHM FOR THE INTRUSION
DETECTION SYSTEM
For any set T ⊂ V, denote the vector of transmissions of
the nodes in that set at time-step k by t[k]. We can write
t[k] = Tz[k] , (4)
where T is a |T | × N matrix with a single 1 in each
row capturing the positions of the vector z[k] that are in
the set T , and zeros elsewhere. We will also ﬁnd it useful
to consider a slightly more general version of the system
model (3). For any subset Q = {vq1,vq2,...,vq|Q|} ⊂ V
of nodes, let EQ =
 
eq1 eq2     eq|Q|
 
, and deﬁne
BQ =
 
H EQ
 
(where H is the matrix from (3) specifying
the linear combinations of the plant outputs that are used by
the source nodes). Note that BQ has p + |Q| columns. The
values transmitted by the monitored nodes T over L + 1
time-steps (for some nonnegative integer L) for the system
z[k + 1] = Wz[k] + BQv[k], t[k] = Tz[k] (5)
are given by







t[k]
t[k + 1]
t[k + 2]
. . .
t[k + L]







      
t[k:k+L]
=







T
TW
TW2
. . .
TWL







      
ΘL
z[k] + M
Q
L







v[k]
v[k + 1]
v[k + 2]
. . .
v[k + L − 1]







      
v[k:k+L−1]
, (6)
2This information can be used for plant monitoring and data logging.
where
M
Q
L ,







0 0     0
TBQ 0     0
TWBQ TBQ     0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
TWL−1BQ TWL−2BQ     TBQ







. (7)
The following theorem shows that the IDS can recover
the desired quantities from the transmissions of nodes in
T , provided that a certain algebraic condition holds. We
will later relate this algebraic condition to conditions on the
network topology and choices of the monitored nodes T .
Theorem 1: Suppose that there exists an integer D such
that, for all possible sets Q of 2f nodes, the matrix MQ
D
satisﬁes
rank
 
MQ
D
 
= p + |Q| + rank
 
MQ
D−1
 
. (8)
Then, as long as there are no more than f malicious nodes in
the network during any set of D contiguous time-steps, the
IDS can uniquely recover the plant outputs y[k] and identify
all of the malicious nodes with a delay of D time-steps,
based on the transmissions of the nodes in T .
Before proceeding with the proof of the above theorem,
we provide a more detailed explanation of condition (8).
Speciﬁcally, note from (7) that for any set Q, the last (L−1)
block-columns of MQ
L have the form
 
0
M
Q
L−1
 
, and thus have
rank equal to the rank of MQ
L−1. Condition (8) is therefore
equivalent to saying that the ﬁrst p + |Q| columns of M
Q
D
must be linearly independent of each other, and of all other
columns in MQ
D. With this interpretation in hand, we are
now ready to continue with the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: [Theorem 1] Consider time-steps k =
0,1,...,D, and suppose that the malicious nodes during this
period are a subset of the set F = {vj1,vj2,...,vjf}. From
(3), (4) and (6), the values seen by the IDS over these time-
steps are given by
t[0 : D] = ΘDz[0] + M
F
Dv[0 : D − 1] , (9)
where v[k] =
 
y′[k] f′[k]
 ′
. Note that the IDS knows the
quantities t[0 : D] and ΘDz[0], but it does not know the set
F or the values v[0 : D − 1]. The IDS will try to identify
these unknown parameters based on the known quantities.
Let F1,F2,...,F(
N
f) ⊂ V denote all possible sets of
f nodes, and let M
F1
D ,M
F2
D ,...,M
F(
N
f)
D denote the input
matrices corresponding to these sets. With these matrices in
hand, suppose that the IDS ﬁnds the ﬁrst j ∈ {1,2,...,
 N
f
 
}
such that the vector t[0 : D]−ΘDz[0] is in the column space
of the matrix M
Fj
D . This means that the IDS can ﬁnd a vector
¯ v[0 : D − 1] such that
M
Fj
D ¯ v[0 : D − 1] = t[0 : D] − ΘDz[0].
The vector ¯ v[0 : D−1] is the IDS’s estimate of the value of
v[0 : D−1] (note that the value ¯ v[k] =
 
¯ y′[k] ¯ f′[k]
 ′
con-
tains estimates of the plant outputs and the malicious errors
5981at time-step k). Substituting (9) into the above expression
and rearranging, we have
MF
Dv[0 : D − 1] − M
Fj
D ¯ v[0 : D − 1] = 0 .
Let {F,Fj} denote the set that is obtained by concatenating
sets F and Fj (i.e., it is the union of the two sets, with
duplications allowed). Exploiting the form of matrix MQ
D
shown in (7), the above expression can be written as







0     0
TB{F,Fj}     0
TWB{F,Fj}     0
. . .
...
. . .
TWD−1B{F,Fj}     TB{F,Fj}







      
M
{F,Fj}
D







˜ v[0]
˜ v[1]
˜ v[2]
. . .
˜ v[D − 1]







= 0
(10)
where B{F,Fj} =
 
H EF EFj
 
and
˜ v[k] =


y[k] − ¯ y[k]
f[k]
−¯ f[k]

 .
Now consider the matrix M
F∪Fj
D . Since F ∪Fj has at most
2f nodes, equation (8) indicates that the ﬁrst p + |F ∪ Fj|
columns of the matrix M
F∪Fj
D are linearly independent of
each other, and of all other columns of the matrix. Now, note
that the matrix M
{F,Fj}
D is obtained from matrix M
F∪Fj
D
simply by duplicating certain columns (namely, the columns
corresponding to nodes that appear in both F and Fj).
Consider a node vl ∈ F. If vl / ∈ Fj, then the column
corresponding to vl within the ﬁrst p + 2f columns of
M
{F,Fj}
D will be linearly independent of all other columns
in M
{F,Fj}
D (since this column will also appear in the
ﬁrst p + |F ∪ Fj| columns of M
F∪Fj
D ). This means that
equation (10) can be satisﬁed only if fl[0] = 0. On the other
hand, if fl[0]  = 0, the only way for equation (10) to be
satisﬁed is if vl ∈ Fj and ¯ fl[0] = fl[0]. In other words, if
equation (8) is satisﬁed, any malicious node that commits an
error during the ﬁrst time-step will appear in set Fj, and its
additive error can be found by the IDS.
Next, note from (8) that the ﬁrst p columns of M
{F,Fj}
D
will be linearly independent of each other and of all other
columns in that matrix (since these columns also appear in
M
F∪Fj
D and are not duplicated in M
{F,Fj}
D ). This means that
the only way for equation (10) to be satisﬁed is if ¯ y[0] =
y[0]. Thus, the IDS has also recovered the outputs of the
plant that were injected into the network at time-step k = 0.
At this point, the IDS knows y[0] and the identities of
those nodes in F that committed errors during time-step 0,
along with the exact values of their additive errors. The IDS
can then use (3) to obtain the transmitted values of all nodes
at time-step k = 1 as
z[1] = Wz[0] + Hy[0] + BFj¯ f[0] .
Now, using the identity
t[1 : D + 1] = ΘDz[1] + M
F
Dv[1 : D] ,
the IDS can repeat the above process to ﬁnd the values of
y[1] along with the identities of the nodes that are malicious
during time-step k = 1. By repeating the above procedure
for all positive values of k, the IDS can obtain the identities
of all malicious nodes and the errors that they commit, along
with the source streams y[k] for all k, simply by listening
to the transmissions of the nodes in T .
V. NETWORK TOPOLOGY CONDITIONS FOR
MISBEHAVIOR IDENTIFICATION AND DATA RECOVERY
Theorem 1 provides a decoding procedure for the IDS
provided that condition (8) is true. In this section, we will
relate this condition to the topology of the network.
A. System Inversion
The quantities y[k] and f[k] in (3) are unknown to the IDS,
and so linear systems of this type are termed linear systems
with unknown inputs.3 For such systems, it is often of interest
to “invert” the system in order to reconstruct some or all
of the unknown inputs, and this problem has been studied
under the moniker of dynamic system inversion [13]. We
will now apply some pertinent results on system inversion
to the problem of detecting and identifying malicious nodes
in the wireless control network. First, recall that for any set
Q ⊆ V, the transfer function of the linear system (5) is
P(z) = T(zI − W)
−1 BQ, which is a |T |×(p+|Q|) matrix
of rational functions of z.
Deﬁnition 1: The system (5) is said to have an L-delay
inverse if there exists a system with transfer function   P(z)
such that   P(z)P(z) = z−LIp+|Q|. The system is invertible if
it has an L-delay inverse for some ﬁnite L. The least integer
L for which an L-delay inverse exists is called the inherent
delay of the system.
In order for the system to be invertible, its transfer function
must have rank p + |Q| over the ﬁeld of rational functions
in z. The following result from [13] and [14] provides a test
for invertibility in terms of the matrices W,BQ and T.
Theorem 2 ([13], [14]): For any nonnegative integer L,
rank(M
Q
L) ≤ p + |Q| + rank(M
Q
L−1) (11)
with equality if and only if the system has an L-delay inverse
(note that rank(MQ
−1) is deﬁned to be zero). If the system is
invertible, its inherent delay will not exceed L = N − p −
|Q| + 1.
We will now relate the algebraic test from the above
theorem to a graph-theoretic test for invertibility.
B. Structured Systems
A linear system of the form (5) is said to be structured if
each entry of the matrices W,BQ and T is either a ﬁxed
zero or an independent free parameter [15]. Interestingly,
such systems have certain properties that can be inferred
purely from the zero/nonzero structure of the system ma-
trices; these properties are generic, meaning that they will
3In our case, the set F (and thus the matrix BF) is also unknown to
the IDS, so the system given by (3) and (4) is more general than the linear
systems with unknown inputs commonly considered in the literature.
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of parameters for which the property does not hold has
Lebesgue measure zero [15]). Of particular relevance to this
paper is the generic normal rank of the transfer function
matrix of a structured system, which is the maximum rank
(over the ﬁeld of rational functions in z) of the transfer
function matrix over all possible choices of free parameters.
To analyze structural properties of linear systems of the
form (5), one associates a graph H with the structured set
(W,BQ,T) as follows. The vertex set of H is given by
V ∪ I ∪ O, where V = {v1,v2,...,vN} is the set of state
vertices, I = {i1,i2,...,ip+|Q|} is the set of input vertices,
and O = {o1,o2,...,o|T |} is the set of output vertices. The
edge set of H is given by Evv ∪ Eiv ∪ Evo, where Evv =
{(vj,vl) | Wlj  = 0}, Eiv = {(ij,vl) | BQ,lj  = 0}, and
Evo = {(vj,ol) | Tlj  = 0} (where Wlj indicates entry
(l,j) of matrix W, and so forth). The following theorem
characterizes the generic normal rank of the transfer function
of a structured linear system in terms of the graph H.
Theorem 3 ([15], [16]): Let the graph of a structured
linear system be given by H. Then the generic normal rank
of the transfer function of the system is equal to the maximal
size of a linking in H from I to O.
The above result says that if the graph of the structured
system (5) has p + |Q| vertex disjoint paths from the
inputs to the outputs, then for almost any choice of free
parameters in W, BQ and T, the transfer function matrix
T(zI − W)−1BQ will have full column rank. Based on
Theorem 2, this will mean that the ﬁrst p + |Q| columns
of the matrix MQ
N−p−|Q|+1 will be linearly independent of
all other columns in MQ
N−p−|Q|+1.
We now have a graph-theoretic characterization of the
invertibility of linear structured systems, and are in place to
apply this to the problem of identifying malicious behavior
and recovering the plant outputs in the WCN.
C. Topological Conditions for Identifying Malicious Nodes
From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the IDS can identify
up to f malicious nodes if the linear system given by the
tuple (W,BQ,T) is invertible for every set Q ⊂ V of
up to 2f nodes. To verify that this property holds, note
that for any given set Q, the tuple (W,BQ,T) essentially
deﬁnes a structured linear system, with the only exception
being that the nonzero entries in the matrices EQ (where
BQ =
 
H EQ
 
) and T are taken to be “1”, rather than
free parameters. However, this is of no consequence, since
each nonzero entry in those matrices appears in a row and
column by itself, and thus can essentially be “scaled” to a
free parameter by an appropriate redeﬁnition of the inputs
and outputs (e.g., see [17]). Thus, we can proceed with
applying the above results on structured system theory to the
tuple (W,BQ,T), which brings us to the following result.
Theorem 4: Let ¯ G = {V ∪S,E ∪EI} denote the graph of
the wireless control network G augmented with the sensor
vertices S and the corresponding edges. Let T ⊂ V denote
the set of monitored nodes. Suppose that for every possible
set Q ⊂ V of 2f nodes, the graph ¯ G contains a (p + 2f)–
linking from S ∪ Q to T . Then, for almost any element
(W,H,G) ∈ Ψs (if it is nonempty), there exists an integer
D ≤ N−p−2f+1 such that the IDS can recover the outputs
of the plant and identify all malicious nodes with a delay of
at most D time-steps, as long as there are no more than f
malicious nodes in any set of D contiguous time-steps.
Proof: For any set Q ⊂ V of 2f nodes, consider the
graph4 HQ associated with the structured set (W,BQ,T).
To obtain this graph, start by taking the graph of the network
G. To this graph, add p + 2f input vertices (denoted by
I) which will connect to the nodes in the graph according
to the structure of the input matrix BQ. Speciﬁcally, p of
these input vertices correspond to the plant sensors S (which
produce y[k]), and each of these has outgoing edges to the
nodes in VS (speciﬁed by the structure of matrix H). The
other 2f input vertices each have a single outgoing edge to
a node in Q (corresponding to the single 1 in each column
of EQ). Next, add |T | output vertices (denoted by the set
O), and place a single edge from each node in the set T to
a node in O, corresponding to the single nonzero entry in
each row of the matrix T. Furthermore, add a self loop to
every state vertex corresponding to the nonzero entries on
the diagonal of the matrix W.
From the statement of the theorem, note that graph ¯ G
contains a linking of size p + 2f from S ∪ Q to T , for any
set Q of 2f nodes. This linking also exists in the graph HQ,
since ¯ G is a subgraph of HQ.5 This linking can be extended
to a linking from the entire set I to T in HQ simply by
including the edges from the set I \S to the set Q. Finally,
this linking can be further extended to a linking from I to O
simply by including the edges from each vertex in T to the
corresponding output vertex in O. From Theorem 3, we see
that the system (W,BQ,T) will be invertible for almost
any choice of matrices W and H (subject to the required
sparsity patterns). This genericness implies that invertibility
will hold simultaneously for all of the sets (W,BQ,T) for
every set Q of 2f nodes with almost any choice of free
parameters in the matrices W and H. From Theorem 2,
the ﬁrst p+|Q| columns of the matrix MQ
N−p−2f+1 will be
linearly independentof each other and of all other columns in
MQ
N−p−2f+1. Thus, condition (8) in Theorem 1 is satisﬁed,
and the IDS can uniquely determine the identities of the
malicious nodes, as well as the values of the plant outputs,
based on the transmissions of the nodes in T , with a delay
of at most N − p − 2f + 1 time-steps.
Finally, we show that there is a tuple (W,H,G) in the set
Ψs (which contains all stabilizing structured matrices for the
plant and is assumed to be nonempty) that allows the IDS to
recover the desired information. This is done by noting that
the set of matrices for which the system is stable has nonzero
measure in Rr (where r is the number of free parameters in
the matrices W and H). More precisely, if λ ∈ Rr denotes
4The notation HQ is used to denote the fact that this graph is associated
with the structured set (W,BQ,T), for a particular set Q of 2f nodes.
5Speciﬁcally, it is the graph obtained by dropping the output vertices and
the 2f input vertices connecting to the set Q in HQ.
5983a numerical vector of free parameters in W and H that
produces stability (e.g., obtained from the procedure in [4]),
the closed loop system will remain stable for any parameter
vectors λ∗ satisfying the component-wise inequalities λ −
ǫ1 ≤ λ∗ ≤ λ + ǫ1, for sufﬁciently small ǫ > 0; this is
because the eigenvalues of a matrix vary continuously with
the parameters in that matrix. Thus, the set of stabilizing
parameters has measure at least (2ǫ)r > 0, whereas the set of
parameters for which the system is not invertible has measure
zero. Thus, for almost any (W,H,G) ∈ Ψs, the system is
stable and allows the IDS to recover the plant outputs and
identify malicious behavior.
Theorem 4 characterizes the set of nodes T that the IDS
should observe in order to achieve its objectives. However,
the fact that the theorem is framed in terms of all possible
sets Q of 2f nodes makes it somewhat unwieldy. One can
come up with a more compact condition when the entire
network is sufﬁciently well connected, as follows.
Corollary 1: Suppose that the network G has connectivity
at least p+2f, and that each sensor in S connects to at least
p+2f source nodes. Let T ⊆ V be any set of at least p+2f
nodes. Then, for almost any element (W,H,G) ∈ Ψs (if it
is nonempty), there exists an integer D ≤ N − p − 2f + 1
such that the IDS can recover the outputs of the plant and
identify all malicious nodes with a delay of D time-steps, as
long as there are no more than f malicious nodes in any set
of D contiguous time-steps.
Proof: For any set Q ⊂ V of 2f nodes, note that
VS \ Q has at least p nodes (since |VS| ≥ p + 2f). Since
each sensor in S connects to at least p + 2f source nodes,
each sensor will connect to at least p nodes in the set VS\Q.
By Hall’s Theorem (e.g., see [12]), there is a linking of size
p from S to VS \ Q (this is also called a matching). Let
¯ VS ⊂ VS be the set of p source nodes contained in this
matching, and note that ¯ VS ∪Q has p+2f nodes. Since the
network has connectivity p+2f, Lemma 1 shows that there
is a linking of size p + 2f from ¯ VS ∪ Q to T . Thus, the
graph ¯ G = {V ∪S,E ∪EI} contains a linking of size p+2f
from S ∪ Q to T for any set Q of 2f nodes. Theorem 4 is
thus satisﬁed, from which the result follows.
Note that the above corollary indicates that in networks
with connectivity p + 2f or higher, any set of p + 2f
nodes can be chosen to be observed by the IDS in order
to recover the desired information about the system. For
example, consider the wireless control network shown in
Fig. 1. The source nodes VS = {v1,v2,v3} have access to
the plant’s (scalar) output y[k] at each time-step. Note that
the connectivity of the network is κ = 3, and since there
is a single sensor on the plant (p = 1) that connects to
three nodes, Corollary 1 indicates that the IDS can detect
and identify up to f = ⌊
κ−p
2 ⌋ = 1 malicious node, simply
by monitoring the transmissions of any p + 2f nodes (e.g.,
the set T = {v3,v6,v9}).
Remark 1: The approach presented in this paper can be
viewed as a form of network coding that has been recently
proposed by the communications community, where nodes in
a network transmit linear combinations of incoming packets
rather than simply routing them (e.g., see [18], [19] and
the references therein). It was shown in [18], [19] that the
capacity of the network must be at least p + 2f in order
to transmit information from p sources to a set of sinks,
despite the presence of f attackers. Our work shows that this
bound holds for the WCN proposed in [4] using a purely
linear system theoretic approach, even though the linear
combinations have been chosen to obtain stability. Further
investigation of the applicability of resilient network coding
to control network design is a ripe avenue for research.
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